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Using Department of Environment data on number of mortgages by
size category we ﬁnd that the Weibull distribution accurately models the
distribution of loans under €300,000 but severely underestimates the num-
ber of larger loans. We therefore use a a Pareto distribution for loans above
this level. We estimate that from 2006 to 2008 there were fewer than 2,000
loans over €1 million with total value of €3 billion; and that there were
11,000 loans over €500,000 with estimated value of €9 billion. While the
number of people taking out these mortgages is unknown, the conjecture
that the largest 10,000 mortgage borrowers owe around €10 billion, largely
for buy to let mortgages, does not appear implausible given these results.
More tentatively, an ecological inference procedure suggests that interest
only mortgages went almost exclusively to property investors.
1 Introduction.
The insolvency of the Irish banks and Irish state as a consequence of bad loans to
property developers raises the obvious question of how much Irish banks stand
to lose on other categories of loans such as mortgages, and in particular on large
mortgages given out to property investors. In this note we attempt to calculate
the exposure of Irish banks to large mortgages.
Between 2005 and 2008 Irish banks lent €25 billion to investment buyers,
compared with €28 billion to ﬁrst time buyers, and €36 billion to movers. The
average loan taken out by investors was €325,000 compared with only €240,000
for ﬁrst time buyers and €270,000 for movers.1 Similarly, of new housing units
∗Department of Economics, University College Dublin.
1IBF/PwC Mortgage Market Proﬁle.
1value 100 150 200 250 300 400
CDF 0.08 0.20 0.40 0.59 0.75 0.91
Table 1: Proportion of mortgages below diﬀererent values (in thousand Euro),
2007.
sold from 2004 to 2008, less than 45 per cent went to ﬁrst time buyers, suggesting
that this market was dominated by investors.
So what is the exposure of Irish banks to large, investor mortgages? The
Department of the Environment publishes statistics on the number and total
value of mortgages paid each year, and on the percentage of these mortgages in
diﬀerent value categories, up to €400,000.2
For example in 2007 banks paid out 84,000 mortgages, worth €22.5 billion.
The proportion below diﬀerent values, in thousand Euro, is shown in Table 1.
We want to estimate what proportion of the value of mortgages is accounted
for the 9 per cent of mortgages over €400,000, and the values of larger categories
of mortgages. We can see immediately that these data have a long right tail,
inconsistent with normality: the mean mortgage was €268,000 while nearly 60
per cent of mortgages were less than €250,000.
In this note, we start with the standard assumption for data with a long right
tail that the data follow a Weibull distribution. We show below that the Weibull
distribution gives a good ﬁt to the value of mortgages given out from 2005 to
2008 under €300,000. However the sharply rising hazard rate of the Weibull
distribution causes it badly to underestimate the fraction of larger mortgages
and, as a consequence, the mean value of all mortgages.
In Section 3 we therefore model the distribution of mortgages over €300,000
with a power law or Pareto distribution. This estimates that only 1,750 mort-
gages were given out over €1 million, but with a total value of €3 billion; while
the estimated 11,000 mortgages over €0.5 million were worth €9 billion. Given
that some individuals took out more than one mortgage, these results suggest
that the estimate that the 10,000 borrowers with the largest mortgages owe
around €10 billion is not implausible.
These large mortgages appear to have gone almost exclusively to property
investors. In Section 4 we apply ecological inference to see the relationship
between investor mortgages and interest only loans. We ﬁnd that interest only
2Latest House Prices, Loans and Proﬁle of Borrowers Statistics at
http://www.environ.ie/en/Publications/StatisticsandRegularPublications/HousingStatistics/.
All statistics are taken from this source unless otherwise stated.
2loans appear to be overwhelmingly concentrated among property investors, but
the limited data makes this ﬁnding conjectural.
The heavy right tail of mortgages means that simple default numbers can be
misleading. For 2007, half of mortgages were for €228,000 or less; and the mean
value of these loans is €155,000. By contrast, for the 4 per cent of mortgages
over €625,000, the mean value was €1 million. It follows that one default in this
upper tail, is equivalent to over six defaults in the lower half of the distribution.
2 The Weibull Distribution.
A standard way to model data with a long right tail is to use a two parameter









x ≥ 0 (1)
with associated cumulative distribution function
F(x) = 1 − e−(x/λ)
k
. (2)
An appealing feature of the Weibull is the linear relationship between the
doubly log transformed quantiles and logx
log(−log(1 − F (x))) = −klogλ + klogx (3)
Plotting log(−log(1 − F (x))) against logx therefore does two things. First,
it allows us to assess the goodness of the Weibull ﬁt: the closer the points to a
straight line, the better the ﬁt of the Weibull distribution.
Figure 1 plots these for the Irish mortgages in 2007 shown in the ﬁrst table.
It can be seen that the relationship is almost linear, consistent with a Weibull
distribution, apart from the largest value corresponding to mortgages below
€400,000 which lies above the the predicted Weibull value. In other words, the
Weibull distribution is conservative, assigning fewer mortgages to the highest
category than was actually the case.
The second use of equation (3) is to estimate the parameters k and λ.
























































Figure 1: Relationship between doubly log transformed empirical cumulative
distribution of Irish mortgages in 2007 and values of mortgages.
The expected value of a Weibull random variable is







where Γ is the gamma function. The average value of mortgages below value
M is










1 − e−(M/λ)k . (5)
The numerator is not analytically integrable but, given estimates of k and λ, it
is straightforward to integrate numerically.
Applying regression (3) to the 2007 data in Table 1, gives an estimate of
k = 2.48,λ = 269. From (4), the predicted mean value of mortgages is €239,000
in 2007, about ten per cent lower than the actual average of €268,000, consistent
with the underestimation of the upper tail of mortgages in Figure 1.
This underestimation of the upper tail is severe: the predicted proportion of
mortgages over €400,000 is 7 per cent, only slightly less than the true value of
9 per cent. However, the tail shrinks rapidly consistent with the sharply rising
4hazard function of the Weibull: only 5 per cent of mortgages are predicted to
be over €420,000, and only 0.1 per cent over €500,000.
By contrast, the ﬁt up to €300,000 is close as Figure 1 suggests. Omitting the
last observation when estimating λ and k, the predicted proportion of mortgages
under €300,000 is 75 per cent, exactly the same as the actual value.
3 Pareto Distribution.
We have seen that the Weibull distribution gives a good ﬁt to mortgages under
€300,000 but signiﬁcantly underestimates the number of larger mortgages. To
ﬁt this upper tail, we make the standard assumption that the distribution of
higher observations follows a power law or Pareto distribution (Johnson, Kotz
and Balakrishnan, 1995, 573–627).
For values of the random variable above a minimum value L the Pareto has
density function
f (x;α) = αLx−(1+α) x ≥ L (6)
and distribution function






The conditional mean of x given x ≥ M ≥ L is
E (x|x ≥ M) =
α
α − 1
M α > 1. (8)
To estimate the parameter α we could estimate the slope of a regression of
−log(1 − F (x)) on logx as we did earlier for the Weibull distribution, but we
clearly lack enough observations in the upper tail of mortgages.
Instead we start with the distribution of mortgages below €300,000; ﬁt a
Weibull distribution to this using (3) and then estimate the mean value of
mortgages in this range from (5). For 2007, the mean value of mortgages under
€300,000 in 2007 is estimated to be €191,000. Given that the mean value of all
mortgages that year was €266,000, it follows that the mean value of the 25 per
cent of mortgages over €300,000 was €491,000. In other words, we constrain
the total value of mortgages given out to equal the actual value, and use the
Pareto to estimate the distribution of loans among value categories.
5α num 400k val 400k num 500k val 500k num 1mil val 1mil
2008 2.37 6,518 4.5 3,841 3.3 743 1.3
2007 2.57 10,070 6.6 5,679 4.7 959 1.6
2006 5.03 5,756 2.9 1,873 1.2 57 0.1
Total 22,344 14.0 11,393 9.2 1,759 3.0
Table 2: Number and value (in billion Euro) of mortgages over €400,000,
€500,000, and €1 million; for 2006–08. Calculations assume a Pareto distri-
bution with parameter α of mortgages over €300,000.
From equation (8) it follows that α = 2.57, so that the number of mortgages
given out falls more than cubically with their value: there will be only one
twelfth as many mortgages of value 2M as of value M, while the mean value of
mortgages over amount M is 1.6M. From (7), the Pareto slightly overestimates
the fraction of mortgages over €400,000 as 11.9 per cent compared with the true
value of 9.1 per cent.
Table 2 gives the estimated number and total value (in billions) of mortgages
paid out from 2006 to 2008. Large mortgages for 2005 appear negligible: the
Pareto distribution estimates that there were only 80 of them. There are an
estimated 22,000 mortgages over €400,000 given out, close to the actual ﬁgure
of 21,000. The estimated value of these is €14 billion. 11,000 mortgages over
€0.5 million account of €9 billion, while 1,750 mortgages over €1 million account
for €3 billion.
It is notable that, although the total number and value of mortgages fell
between 2006 and 2008 3, the share of mortgages going to large loans rose
which is shown by the falling parameter α.
The data are therefore consistent with a small number of mortgages ac-
counting for a large share of total loans. What the data do not indicate is how
many people took out these mortgages. It would appear that few of these large
loans were used for purchasing the borrower’s own home—one of the largest
mortgage providers has claimed that it made only 4 mortgages over €1 million
for this purpose during the boom—and that nearly all were used for property
investment.
3111,000 mortgages worth €25.4 billion in 2006; 84,000 worth €22.4 billion in 2007; 54,000
worth €14.5 billion in 2008.
6Interest only Annuity
Investor ? ? 13
Other ? ? 87
20 80
Table 3: Proportion of interest only and investor loans, third quarter 2007.
4 Interest Only Loans.
Given that most of these large mortgages were taken out by property investors,
what percentage were interest only loans?
The Department of the Environment gives the proportion of loans (by num-
ber) that were interest only and the Irish Banking Federation the proportion
(again by number) that were for property investment. For instance, in the last
quarter of 2007, 20 per cent of loans approved were interest only, while investors
accounted for 13 per cent of mortgages paid. We are interested in what fraction
of investor loans were interest only.
In terms of Table 3, we know the row and column sums, and want to know the
entries in the four inner boxes. To estimate this we apply ecological inference,
using the row and column sums for the 24 quarters from 2005 to 2010. Because
of the small number of observations and potential instability during this period,
our results are necessarily tentative. Estimation involves calculating a bivariate
logit for the proportion of interest only loans to investors and other borrowers.
We apply the nonparametric Bayesian procedure of Imai, Lu and Strauss (2011),
implemented in the R package eco.
The results indicate that 67 per cent of mortgages given to investors were
interest only, with a 95 per cent credible interval from [0.47,0.79]. For other
mortgages, the estimated proportion of interest only loans is only 4 per cent
with a credible interval [0.02,0.07]. In other words, interest only mortgages
appear to have gone predominantly to investors. The rise in interest only loans
during 2007 coincided with the making of large loans to investors noted above,
suggesting that interest only loans went to those taking the largest investment
mortgages.
5 Conclusions.
The starting point for this analysis was the claim in the Irish Times of 6 May
2010 in a story entitled “Interest-only mortgages depended on a rising market
7and now many in the small-time landlord sector smell trouble” that “the interest-
only candy pot was also raided by an estimated 10,000 accountants, lawyers
and other professionals who spent between €1 million and €2 million each on
buying homes with a typical loan-to-value mortgage of 80 per cent.” Assuming
an average purchase price of €1.4 million (the geometric mean of the end points);
this suggests total borrowings of €11 billion.
Our analysis here has shown that instead of 10,000 million plus mortgages,
there were probably fewer than 2,000 and these were mostly for investment
rather than own home mortgages. However, looking at the 11,000 largest mort-
gages from the bubble peak of 2006-08, we ﬁnd that the total is €9 billion.
We do not know how many people held more than one mortgage, but it does
not seem implausible that the total indebtedness of the 10,000 people with the
largest mortgage debt is in the region of €10 billion.
The heavy right tail in mortgage lending suggests that considerable caution
is needed in looking at default rates on mortgages: a single default on a few
large mortgages can exceed the impact of many defaults on mortgages close to
or below the median.
The extent of losses on these large investor loans are, of course, unknowable
at this stage. In Kelly (2010) I showed how the value of Irish property was
driven by the ﬂow of new mortgages. Given that the value of new investor
mortgages has fallen by 99 per cent between the second quarters of 2007 and
2011 suggests that recovery rates on defaulted mortgages could be extremely
low.
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